N NI IP PE E 1 Introduction
In many European countries, wages are set in two stages. First, industry-level collective bargaining establishes a binding wage ‡oor, common to all …rms in the industry. At a second stage, …rm-speci…c arrangements determine a mark-up on top of the central wage. Such a two-tiered wage setting system tends to originate a large di¤erence between actual paid wages and the central wage ‡oor, a phenomena typically referred to as the wage cushion or the wage drift. 1 What explains the wage set in each of these stages? The key contribution of this paper is to show that both the industry wage ‡oor and the average wage cushion are systematically associated with the degree of …rm heterogeneity in the industry. The industry wage ‡oor is negatively correlated, while the average wage cushion is positively correlated, with the productivity spread. The main intuition for these results is that in industries with more heterogeneous …rms an industry-wide union has a rational incentive to impose a lower wage ‡oor in order to preclude job losses in less productive …rms. Greater …rm heterogeneity and a lower wage ‡oor, on the other hand, leave more room for …rm-speci…c rent-sharing, thereby increasing the average wage cushion.
To formalise these arguments, we develop a model of Cournot oligopoly with …rm productivity heterogeneity and a two-tiered wage setting system. At the outset, an industry-wide monopoly union sets a wage ‡oor, common to all producers. At a second stage, …rm-speci…c wages and employment are determined. To characterise wage determination at the local level, we adopt a general formulation of rent-sharing, which is consistent with di¤erent underlying mechanisms proposed in the literature to explain its existence namely, …rm-speci…c fair wage policies and local bargaining. When setting the wage ‡oor at the outset of the game, the central union anticipates the implications of its actions for the determination of actual wages and employment at the second stage. The model yields clear and intuitive predictions about the e¤ect of …rm heterogeneitymeasured as a mean-preserving spread of labour productivities -on wage setting. Notably, for 'reasonable' parameter con…gurations, we …nd that more heterogeneity leads to a lower industry wage ‡oor and a higher (average) wage cushion; since the former of these e¤ects tends to dominate the latter, all else equal workers in more heterogeneous industries tend to get lower wages.
We then proceed by taking the model predictions to the data. With that aim, we exploit Quadros de Pessoal, an unusually comprehensive administrative worker-…rm dataset that is particularly well suited for investigating this question. Quadros de Pessoal comprises information on virtually all workers, …rms and collective bargaining agreements for the Portuguese private sector. It also allows 1 Such a two-tiered wage setting process is prevalent in the Nordic countries (Calmfors, 1990; Holden, 1989 Holden, , 1998 , Germany (Hübler and Jirjahn, 2003) , Italy (Ordine, 1995) , Spain (Dolado et al, 1997) , The Netherlands (Butter and Eppink, 2003) and Portugal (Cardoso and Portugal, 2005) . Flanagan (1999) and OECD (2004) o¤er recent literature surveys. Following Cardoso and Portugal (2005) , throughout this paper we will use the expression wage cushion to label the di¤erence between actual wages and the union wage ‡oor, noting however that the concept wage drift has also been frequently adopted in the literature to designate this phenomena.
to distinguish, at the individual-level, between the industry wage ‡oor and the wage cushion. Since there is a unique identi…er for the collective agreement that covers each worker, it is possible to determine the exact set of …rms that constitute the industry for collective bargaining purposes.
Given that there is also information on the …rm side, we are able to compute standard measures of …rm productivity heterogeneity in each industry, and then test whether they are systematically associated with the industry wage ‡oor and the average wage cushion (and hence with actual paid wages). The econometric results con…rm our theoretical predictions. This paper relates to several strands of existing research. There are some structural similarities between the model presented here and a relatively small literature on unionised labour markets with a two-tiered wage setting process. Inspired by the collective bargaining system of the Nordic countries, Holden (1998) provides a model in which local unions make use of 'work-to-rule'practices to negotiate a wage rate that exceeds the central wage ‡oor. 2 The link between the two tiers of the wage determination process is explicitly modelled: when bargaining at the industry-level, central unions fully anticipate that the negotiated wage will constitute the fall-back position of …rm-level unions during subsequent local bargaining. As a result, the expected wage cushion is fully re ‡ected in central negotiations. A competing view associates the wage cushion with e¢ ciency wage policies pursued by the …rms. Muysken and van Veen (1996) o¤er a model in which, rather than forced by local unions to divide an exogenous amount of rents, employers have a rational incentive to pay a mark-up on top of the contractual wage in order to maximise worker e¤ort. Their paper provides, therefore, an alternative explanation for the wage cushion, which is expected to be particularly relevant in countries where centralised negotiations are not typically followed by local collective bargaining. 3 A common feature of this line of work is the use of a representative …rm framework.
Therefore, the implication of …rm heterogeneity for wage setting -which is the central focus of our paper -is never an issue in this literature.
A set of contributions in the union-oligopoly literature are also relevant in our context. The seminal paper by Dowrick (1989) , and several extensions (e.g., Dhillon and Petrakis, 2002) , o¤er oligopoly models with centralised union wage setting. 4 There are, however, two crucial di¤erences between this line of work and our paper. First, the assumption that …rms are homogeneous. Second, the absence of local (…rm-speci…c) wage setting following centralised bargaining. As a result, in all these models the actual paid wage is always equal to the central contracted wage.
We would also like to draw attention to a recent literature on how …rm heterogeneity in ‡uences wage determination. Building on the in ‡uential paper of Melitz (2003) , recent work by Egger and Kreickemeier (2008) and Davis and Harrigan (2007) shows that, in the presence of …rm-speci…c e¢ ciency wage policies, …rm heterogeneity leads to di¤erent wages for ex-ante identical workers. 5 Neither of these papers, however, focuses on union wage setting or two-tiered wage setting systems.
Finally, we would like to place our empirical work within the received literature. The empirical analysis by Cardoso and Portugal (2005) is clearly the closest to our own. Using the same dataset employed in this paper, they propose a new methodology to infer the contractual wage for each job category from actual paid wages. Speci…cally, they show that the mode of the distribution of the base wage for each job category within each collective agreement corresponds with remarkable accuracy to the wage set through collective bargaining. 6 We will use the same procedure here to compute the union wage ‡oor and the wage cushion. Cardoso and Portugal then report evidence that a signi…cant proportion of workers covered by collective agreements actually receive wages well above the union wage ‡oor. Although agreements are not ordinarily supplemented by local collective bargaining, …rms unilaterally adjust wage policies to re ‡ect their speci…c conditions.
Using a cross-section of the matched worker-…rm data for 1999, they …nd that the wage cushion stretches the returns to worker and …rm attributes. Crucially, however, Cardoso and Portugal do not focus on how the degree of …rm heterogeneity in ‡uences wage setting, which is the main contribution of this paper.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we present a theoretical model and derive predictions for the empirical analysis. In Section 3 we discuss the empirical implementation. Our empirical …ndings are presented in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 o¤ers some concluding remarks.
A theoretical model
Consider an industry consisting of two …rms, each producing a di¤erentiated product. Inverse demand for the two products is given by p i = a q i bq j ; i; j = 1; 2; i 6 = j;
where q i is quantity of product i, supplied by …rm i, and b 2 (0; 1) is an inverse measure of the degree of product di¤erentiation. Where appropriate, we will later refer to b as a measure of the intensity of competition in the industry.
Each …rm uses labour as the only factor of production in a constant-returns-to-scale technology,
given by the following production functions:
We introduce heterogeneity among …rms, not workers. Workers are assumed to be ex ante identical, but technological (or managerial) di¤erences among …rms imply that …rm heterogeneity is re ‡ected in di¤erences in labour productivity. The mean productivity in the industry is given by , while the parameter s 2 (0; 1) measures the productivity spread (or the degree of …rm heterogeneity). 7 We make the crucial assumption that the wage a …rm has to pay its workers re ‡ects …rm-level rent-sharing. One way to obtain this feature is to adopt the 'fair wage' hypothesis. Assume, as in Akerlof and Yellen (1990) , that workers condition their e¤ort on the wage paid relative to the wage considered to be fair. If workers receive at least the 'fair wage', they provide a normal level of e¤ort. By an appropriate choice of e¤ort function, it will then be optimal for the …rm to pay the fair wage. 8 With this assumption, pro…ts are given by
where w i is the fair wage paid to workers at …rm i.
It remains to establish the determinants of the fair wage. We use an internal reference perspective and assume that the fair wage depends on the …rm's ability to pay. More speci…cally, we assume that the fair wage is given by a weighted average of the wage set by a central trade union and the …rm's revenue per worker. 9 The former constitutes a contracted wage ‡oor for the industry, while the latter is the …rm's maximum possible wage o¤er. Denoting the contracted wage ‡oor by w, the fair wage in …rm i is given by
7 It is worth pointing out that the duopoly assumption is made for expositional simplicity and is not crucial for the generality of the results. It can easily be veri…ed that our main results are qualitatively una¤ected by adding more …rms to the industry while maintaining a symmetric …rm heterogeneity. 8 For example, as in Akelof and Yellen (1990), if worker e¤ort is given by e = min w w ; 1 ;
where w is the actual paid wage and w is the fair wage, the …rm will not bene…t from paying less than the fair wage, since e¤ort decreases proportionally if the wage falls short of what the workers consider to be fair. 9 This de…nition of a fair wage is similar in spirit to the one used by Danthine and Kurmann (2006) . A somewhat di¤erent internal reference perspective is used by Akerlof and Yellen (1990) , who assume that workers of di¤erent skills compare their wages to other co-workers within the same …rm.
where 2 (0; 1) is the weight attached to the wage ‡oor relative to the maximum possible wage o¤er.
When the fair wage is, to some degree, determined by internal factors, intra-industry di¤erences in labour productivity will be re ‡ected in wage di¤erences across …rms. Notice also that there is an obvious analytical advantage of this particular speci…cation, namely that a similar wage outcome can result from local wage bargaining. 10 Thus, we can alternatively interpret as the relative bargaining power of the …rm in local bargaining.
The industry wage ‡oor, w, is set by a central monopoly trade union representing all workers in the industry. Assuming rent-maximising behaviour, the union's objective function is given by
where r is the reservation wage level. Standard assumptions on the determinants of r would be the minimum wage level, the level of unemployment bene…ts, or simply the disutility of work. 11 Assuming Cournot competition between the …rms in the industry, we consider the following sequence of events:
1. The central trade union sets the wage ‡oor w that applies for the industry.
2. The …rms simultaneously and independently choose employment levels, taking into account the wage rates they need to pay in order to induce normal e¤ort from their workers.
3. Production takes place and payo¤s are realised.
Solving for the Cournot-Nash equilibrium
For a given wage ‡oor, w, the two …rms decide how many workers to hire, taking into account that they have to pay them the fair wage, given by (5), to induce normal worker e¤ort. This yields the following labour demand functions 12
The corresponding fair wages are then found by inserting the equilibrium expressions for l 1 (w) and (5), yielding
and
It is straightforward to verify that wages paid at both …rms are increasing in the wage ‡oor, and that the wage di¤erence (w 1 w 2 ) is increasing in the degree of …rm heterogeneity, as measured by s.
At the outset of the game, the wage ‡oor is set by a central rent-maximising trade union. Thus, w is given by
From (9)- (10) and (11) it is immediately evident that both the wage ‡oor and the actually paid wages are increasing in the level of labour productivity ( ), as expected. For the subsequent analysis of the wage e¤ects of …rm heterogeneity, it is useful to de…ne some wage concepts. The wage cushion in …rm i is given by i = w i w, the average wage cushion is given by
while the average (actual paid) wage is given by ! = w + .
Firm heterogeneity and wages
In this section we use our model to analyse the main question posed in the paper; how the distribution of …rm productivities in a given unionised industry a¤ect wage setting, at industry and …rm level.
The wage ‡oor
The e¤ect of …rm heterogeneity on the industry wage ‡oor is derived from (11):
The sign of this expression is determined by the sign of the numerator. Since this is clearly positive,
we establish the most general result of this section:
Proposition 1 A higher degree of …rm heterogeneity in the industry will reduce the wage ‡oor if one or more of the following conditions are met:
(i) The reservation wage level, r, is su¢ ciently low.
(ii) The degree of competition in the industry, b, is su¢ ciently low.
(iii) The …rms' share of rents, , is su¢ ciently high.
The intuition for this result is not straightforward. The central union's wage setting incentives can be decomposed into two di¤erent channels: the e¤ect of the wage ‡oor on (i) aggregate employment and (ii) actual wages. Increased …rm heterogeneity will change the union's wage setting incentives through both channels, and in opposite directions.
(i) Increased …rm heterogeneity implies that aggregate employment becomes more elastic with respect to the wage ‡oor. This elasticity is given by
from which we derive
A decomposition of the elasticity shows that more heterogeneity increases (reduces) labour demand elasticity for the low (high) productivity …rm. This is because higher (lower) labour productivity reduces (increases) the e¤ect of an increase in the e¤ ective wage rate (i.e., the price of one e¢ ciency unit of labour) on labour demand. Notice, however, that the impact of a (marginal) change in labour productivity on the relationship between the wage rate and the e¤ective wage rate, is smaller the higher the labour productivity is. Therefore, the e¤ect on labour demand elasticity in the low-productivity …rm is always dominating. Thus, all else equal, a central union in a more heterogeneous industry will set a lower wage ‡oor to stimulate employment in the low-productivity …rm.
(ii) Increased …rm heterogeneity also a¤ects how an increase in the wage ‡oor translates into an increase in actual paid wages. Speci…cally, the positive relationship between the wage ‡oor and actual wages becomes overall stronger. From (9) and (10) we can see that it becomes stronger for the high-productivity …rm and weaker for the low-productivity …rm,
but overall stronger, since
@s@w . Thus, all else equal, a central union in a more heterogeneous industry will set a higher wage ‡oor to induce higher actual wages in the most productive …rm.
The relative strengths of these two opposite incentives are determined by the parameter con…g-uration. A lower reservation wage level means that, all else equal, employment e¤ects are relatively more important, strengthening the …rst incentive relative to the second. On the other hand, a lower degree of competition and a lower degree of local rent-sharing imply that the relationship between the wage ‡oor and actual wages are less in ‡uenced by …rm heterogeneity, making the second incentive less important. Why? Because less competition in the market means that productivity di¤erences are to a lesser extent re ‡ected in relative market shares. Consequently, more heterogeneity has a lower impact on the allocation of rents, which partly determine the actual paid wages, when there is less competition in the industry. Similarly, if the …rms share less rents with their workers, productivity di¤erences translate, to a lower degree, into di¤erences in actual wages.
Thus, less competition and/or less local rent-sharing imply that the degree of …rm heterogeneity has a lower impact on the relationship between the wage ‡oor and actual paid wages. Indeed, from (15) and (16) we see that the relationship between w and w i is independent of s, if b ! 0 or ! 1.
It should be emphasised that the parameter con…guration that yields a positive relationship between …rm heterogeneity and the industry wage ‡oor is quite limited. To provide an illustration of this, consider the case of maximum competition, b = 1. In this case, it is possible to show that @w=@s < 0, for all admissible values of r, if > 2 3s(1+s) 5+3s(2 s) (< 0:4). Thus, for 'reasonable' parameter con…gurations, the dominant incentive of the central union is to stimulate employment in low-productivity …rms, resulting in a lower wage ‡oor in more heterogeneous industries.
The wage cushion
For the sake of analytical feasibility, we will explore the e¤ects of …rm heterogeneity on the wage cushion, and thus on actual wages, by considering the special case of homogeneous products and a zero reservation wage. 13 This restricts the parameter con…gurations to a subset where there is always a negative relationship between the degree of …rm heterogeneity and the wage ‡oor, which, as argued above, we consider to be the most likely case. Setting b = 1 and r = 0, the equilibrium wage expressions are given by
It is easily shown that increased …rm heterogeneity will increase (decrease) the wage cushion in the high (low) productivity …rm; @ 1 =@s > 0 and @ 2 =@s < 0, as expected. More interesting is the e¤ect on the average wage cushion, given by = ! w. Using (17) and (20), this e¤ect is The sign of (21) is given by the sign of the numerator, where the sign of is a priori ambiguous.
By numerical simulations, it can be shown that @ =@s > 0, for all , if s < s 0:48. Since s measures the percentage di¤erence from the mean, s < s appears to be a weak condition. Thus, we conclude that, for 'reasonable'parameter con…gurations, a higher degree of …rm heterogeneity leads to a lower industry wage ‡oor but a higher average wage cushion. An increase in the productivity spread implies a more uneven distribution of rents. For a given wage ‡oor, this should lead to a lower (higher) wage cushion in low (high) productivity …rms. However, since the central union responds by lowering the industry wage ‡oor, there is less need for a reduction in the wage cushion in low-productivity …rms, while there is more room for an increase in the wage cushion in highproductivity …rms. Furthermore, a higher productivity spread also implies a reallocation of workers towards the high-productivity …rms. Both these e¤ects contribute to an increase in the average wage cushion.
The e¤ect of …rm heterogeneity on the average (actual paid) wage, !, is given by
which, due to the potentially opposite signs of @w=@s and @ =@s, is generally ambiguous. From (22) , the total e¤ect is given by
implying that the e¤ect via the industry wage ‡oor always dominates, establishing a negative relationship between …rm heterogeneity and average actual paid wages.
Based on the above analysis, we postulate the following hypotheses for the empirical analysis.
Industries exhibiting larger …rm heterogeneity, measured by a mean-preserving spread of labour productivites, are expected to be characterised by (i) a lower industry wage ‡oor;
(ii) a higher (average) wage cushion;
(iii) a lower (average) actual paid wage.
3 Empirical implementation
Data
We test our theory using data from Quadros de Pessoal (QP) for the years 1991 to 2000. This is an administrative dataset that comprises information on virtually all workers, …rms and collective agreements from the private sector in Portugal. It gathers information from a compulsory census run by the Ministry of Employment, covering the population of …rms with wage earners in manufacturing and services. Each …rm is required to provide information on an annual basis about its characteristics and those of each individual that comprises its workforce.
Firm-level information includes annual sales, number of employees, industry code, geographical location and date of constitution. The set of worker characteristics includes wages (monthly base wage and other components of pay), gender, schooling, date of starting, occupation and hours worked. In addition, the worker data includes unique identi…ers for the collective bargaining agreement that covers the worker, as well as for the corresponding professional category for collective bargaining purposes. The …rst digit of the collective agreement identi…er indicates the type of contract that covers the worker (sectoral, multi-…rm, …rm, mandatory regime). A worker may also be matched to the …rm.
An important feature of these data is that particular care is placed on the reliability of the information. Indeed, the data are used by the Ministry of Employment for checking the employer's compliance with labour law. Moreover, Portuguese law makes it compulsory for …rms to make this information available to every worker in a public place of the establishment.
Extensive checks have been performed to guarantee the accuracy of worker and …rm data, according to the procedures outlined in the Appendix. After these checks, we kept for analysis full-time wage earners working at least 25 hours a week, aged between 16 and 65, earning at least the national minimum wage, employed in …rms located in mainland Portugal. As in Cardoso and
Portugal (2005), because the contractual wage is computed as the mode of the distribution of base wages for each job category within each collective agreement, only categories comprising at least 50 workers and agreements with at least 1,000 workers were kept for the analysis. In line with the theoretical framework of the previous section, we restrict the analysis to workers covered by sectoral agreements, who represent about 88% of these workers. The resulting panel comprises information on 1,886,703 workers, 216,681 …rms and 198 sectoral agreements, yielding a total of 7,420,900 worker-year observations. Cardoso and Portugal show that the mode of the base wage distribution for each professional category within each collective agreement corresponds strongly, in some cases with remarkable accuracy, to the wage that is set via collective bargaining. 14 We adopt the same procedure here to compute the contractual wage. The wage cushion for worker k = f1; :::; N g in year t = f1; :::; T g is de…ned as:
Computing the wage ‡oor and the wage cushion
where w kt is the overall monthly earnings actually received by individual k in year t (including the base wage, tenure-related and other regularly paid components) and w cat is the modal base wage for the worker's professional category, within the collective agreement that covers the worker in year t. The following subsection outlines the empirical strategy for examining the e¤ect of the levels and distribution of …rm productivities in each industry on contractual wages, the wage cushion and actual wages.
Econometric model
We adopt the following econometric speci…cation:
As the dependent variable, we consider the central wage ‡oor, the wage cushion and actual wage, as de…ned in the previous sub-section: wage kt = fw cat ; kt ; w kt g. Our central variables at and s at measure, respectively, the mean and the spread of …rm labour productivity within the collective agreement that covers the worker. Our main interest lies in the coe¢ cient , which captures the e¤ect of …rm heterogeneity. The mean of …rm labour productivity, at , is included since, in order meaningfully to compare …rm heterogeneity across collective agreements, we obviously need to control for the mean. The set of explanatory variables also includes: x kt , a vector of individual characteristics; y jt , a vector of characteristics for …rm j at which worker k is employed in year t;
k , a pure individual unobserved e¤ect; v , a pure industry e¤ect; r , a pure region e¤ect; t , a …xed time e¤ect; and, …nally, kt is an exogenous disturbance.
In the empirical analysis, we measure at and s at , respectively, as the average and the mean absolute deviation (MAD) of …rm sales per employee within the collective agreement that covers the worker. 15;16 The vector of worker control variables includes gender, age, age squared, years of schooling, tenure, tenure less than one year and four occupational dummies based on the 1988
International Standard Classi…cation of Occupations (ISCO-88). This classi…cation provides four skill-levels which are based on (i) the level of general education required to perform a job; and (ii) the job-related formal training required to perform a job (ILO, 1990). 17 The vector of …rm characteristics includes …rm size (log of number of employees), age, and nominal average labour productivity (log of …rm annual sales per employee). To control for unobserved industry characteristics, all regressions include a full set of …fteen industry-dummies. In addition, the regressions include …ve regional dummies to account for disparities in earnings across regions. As is standard in the literature, wages and …rm sales are de ‡ated by the CPI and the GDP de ‡ator, respectively. 18 1 5 In the absence of data on intermediate inputs and inventories, the use of sales per employee to proxy …rm labour productivity is standard in the literature (see, for example, Franco and Philippon, 2007). 1 6 As a robustness check, we also use the standard deviation as an alternative spread measure. See Section 4.2. 1 7 See the Appendix for a detailed description. 1 8 Data on CPI and GDP de ‡ators come from the National Statistics Institute of Portugal. 
Summary statistics and econometric results
Due to computational constraints, in the regression analysis we use a 20 percent random sample of workers from the checked panel (keeping all yearly information for the sampled workers). Table   1 presents descriptive statistics on these data. The average wage cushion is 0.23, con…rming the importance of …rm-speci…c arrangements following industry-level collective bargaining for wage formation. 19 Furthermore, the summary statistics reveal that our measures of the productivity spread exhibit signi…cant dispersion. 20 Such variation will be particularly useful for identifying the e¤ect of …rm heterogeneity on wages in the econometric analysis.
Baseline model
In order to control for worker-speci…c unobserved heterogeneity, we exploit the longitudinal nature of the data and estimate individual …xed-e¤ects models. In addition, the regressions include a full set of industry, region, and year dummies. For each estimate, we provide in parentheses the standard errors that account for clustering by collective wage agreement and year. Table 2 presents the …xed e¤ects results for our baseline speci…cation (25). The results shown here clearly con…rm the predictions from our theoretical model. Even after including a large set of worker and …rm controls, a larger …rm heterogeneity, expressed by the mean absolute deviation (MAD), implies a signi…cantly (at the 1 per cent level) lower industry wage ‡oor and higher wage cushion. The actual wage declines as well, as the e¤ect on the wage ‡oor dominates the e¤ect on the wage cushion. Moreover, in all three cases, the magnitude of the impacts, measured by the implied wage-spread elasticities, is noticeable. For instance, if …rm heterogeneity in the industry doubles, the elasticity …gures indicate that, on average, the wage ‡oor declines by 3.7%, the wage cushion rises by 2.3% and the actual wage paid reduces by 1.4%. These impacts are certainly non-negligible, taking into account that the distribution of the MAD across sectoral agreements and time is very wide. For example, half of the mean MAD is at the 41st percentile, while the double of the mean MAD is at the 92nd percentile.
The e¤ect of …rm labour productivity has the expected positive sign for all wage measures.
Notice also that the e¤ect on the wage cushion is pronouncedly stronger than on the wage ‡oor, suggesting the presence of …rm-level rent-sharing, which is a key mechanism in our theoretical model. The impact of the average productivity level qualitatively follows that of …rm-level productivity, except for the case of the wage cushion, where there is a negative relationship. This probably re ‡ects a certain degree of asymmetry in the productivity distribution.
The remaining estimates shown in the table are all signi…cant and present the expected sign.
They also provide further con…rmation to Cardoso and Portugal's (2005) …nding (based on a single cross-section) that the wage cushion tends to stretch the impact of worker and …rm attributes on wages.
One potential concern with the …xed e¤ects estimates is that both the contractual wage and the actual paid wage are left-censored. The former cannot fall below the national minimum wage, while the latter cannot be lower than the union wage ‡oor, implying that the wage cushion cannot be negative. 21 As a result, our least squares estimates might be biased. We directly address this concern by estimating Tobit random e¤ects models.
An inspection of Table 3 shows that controlling for censoring e¤ects only reinforce our previous …ndings. The marginal e¤ects of the spread of …rm labour productivity are (again) signi…cant at the 1 per cent level and slightly larger than the ones found earlier. The elasticity e¤ects are therefore larger. The exception is the elasticity for the wage cushion. According to the Tobit estimates, if …rm heterogeneity doubles, then the wage ‡oor reduces by 5.7% while the actual wage paid reduces by 2.7%. 2 1 Censoring a¤ects 2% and 16.7% of the observations in each case, respectively. The remaining estimates, once more, are signi…cant at the 1 per cent level and follow previous literature.
Alternative measures of at and s at
As an alternative to the MAD, we use the standard deviation (SD) of …rm sales per worker within each collective agreement as a measure of the productivity spread. The upper (lower) part of Table   4 reports some selected results from the …xed e¤ects (Tobit random e¤ects) model. 22 Using the SD as an alternative measure of the productive spread, we obtain further con…rmation 2 2 Full results are available from the authors upon request.
of our theoretical predictions. The major di¤erence is the size of the e¤ects, which are now much smaller than the ones initially found. 23 However, it is worth noticing that the mean and the volatility of this series are also much higher, as suggested by the summary statistics in Table 1 .
This means that, when compared to the MAD, the same relative change in the productivity spread measured by the SD implies a much larger absolute variation. Thus, some caution is needed when comparing the results using these two di¤erent measures of …rm heterogeneity.
As a further robustness check, we have also used weighted measures for the …rst and second moments of the …rms productivity distribution. To do so, we compute the mean and the spread of …rm productivity within each collective agreement using the information on …rm sales per employee at the worker-level. The resulting measures are, therefore, weighted by the number of workers in each …rm. The results not shown (but available upon request) are qualitatively similar.
Alternative measure of the wage cushion
So far, we have assumed that the wage cushion in (24) is fully driven by …rm-speci…c arrangements following industry-wide collective bargaining. As noted by Cardoso and Portugal (2005) , however, some industry agreements also include clauses on tenured-related payments. In such cases, the central union might have some direct in ‡uence on the wage cushion de…ned in (24) , thereby challenging our interpretation of the econometric results. To address this concern, we follow Cardoso and Portugal and consider the wage cushion in base wages only. In other words, we exclude tenurerelated and other regular components of pay from actual paid wages when computing the wage cushion. The regression results for this alternative measure are presented in Table 5 . We …nd that the relationship between the various measures of …rm heterogeneity considered earlier and the wage cushion remains positive and statistically signi…cant in all speci…cations.
Moreover, in either model -…xed e¤ect or Tobit random e¤ect -the magnitude of the e¤ects for this alternative measure of the wage cushion is similar (slightly larger).
Concluding remarks
If actual paid wages result from a combination of industry-wide and …rm-speci…c wage settingas in most countries with a certain degree of union centralisation -what determines the relative importance of the two levels in such a two-tiered wage setting system? In this paper we have o¤ered one particular contribution to answering this question, by focusing on the role of …rm heterogeneity within industries. While it is intuitively plausible that …rm heterogeneity should play a role in determining the relationship between centralised and decentralised wage setting, the present paper is, to the best of our knowledge, the …rst attempt to analyse -theoretically and empirically -this particular relationship.
Our results are clear and consistent. There is a systematic correlation between …rm heterogeneity and wages set at the two stages. In more heterogeneous industries, the industry wage ‡oor is lower, while the average wage cushion is higher. Furthermore, the former e¤ect dominates the latter, implying that actual paid wages are lower, all else equal, in more heterogeneous industries. The mechanisms behind these relationships are explained by a theoretical model of a unionised Cournot oligopoly with …rm productivity heterogeneity and a two-tiered wage setting system. The relationships are then empirically con…rmed by using a panel dataset covering virtually all workers, …rms and collective bargaining agreements of the Portuguese private sector for the period 1991-2000, and the results are robust to di¤erent speci…cations and heterogeneity measures.
By way of conclusion, it should be stressed that in this paper we have only focused on one particular factor -…rm heterogeneity -in explaining the discrepancy between centrally bargained and actually paid wages. Although we have shown that this is a signi…cant part of the explanation, it is clearly not the whole explanation. In particular, it would be interesting to explore also the role of worker heterogeneity. While worker attributes obviously a¤ect wages set in each stage, it is tempting to speculate that worker heterogeneity per se could potentially play a role in explaining the relationship between bargained and actual paid wages. This is, however, left for future research.
(ii) Dealing with inconsistent data on gender, birth date or schooling over time. When information was reported inconsistently over time, the information reported more than half of the times has been taken as the correct one. Inconsistent values on gender were replaced, after checking that the date of birth in the observation to be corrected was the same as the most frequently reported date of birth for that worker. A similar procedure was followed for the birth date and education, replacing inconsistent values with that reported more than half of the times. According to this procedure, 0.84 percent, 2.54 percent and 5.65 percent of the observations in the initial panel have been corrected for gender, birth date and education, respectively. All information on a worker was dropped in case of remaining inconsistencies after the implementation of the previously described corrections. This led to dropping 8.77 percent of the observations in the initial panel due to inconsistencies for gender, 0.18 percent for age and 0.93 percent for education.
(iii) Deleting data on workers with remaining missing data on gender, age or schooling. Workers with missing data after the implementation of the previous corrections were dropped. This led to dropping 0.18 percent of the observations in the initial panel due to missing age and 0.93 percent due to missing data on schooling. The checked panel included 17,366,086 worker-year observations and 3,062,216 workers.
A.2.2. Constraints imposed
(i) Keeping full time workers, aged between 16 and 65 years old, earning at least the national minimum wage. Only full-time workers working at least 25 hours a week, aged between 16 and 65 years old, earning at least the national minimum wage were kept for the analysis (the national minimum wage constraint might imply dropping workers in particular categories, such as apprentices and workers aged less than 18 years old). These restrictions led to dropping, respectively, 19.15, 2.33 and 4.04 percent of the observations in the checked panel.
(ii) Keeping job categories with at least 50 workers and agreements with at least 1,000 workers.
As in Cardoso and Portugal (2005) , because we are computing the contractual wage as the mode of the distribution of base wages for each job category within each collective agreement, for each year we have kept categories with at least 50 workers and agreements with at least 1,000 workers.
These restrictions led to dropping 9.08 percent and 1.16 percent of the checked panel, respectively.
(iii) Keeping workers covered by sectorial agreements. After the previous constraints, 87.76 percent of the workers and 83.6 percent of the worker-year observations are covered by sectorial agreements, which are kept for the analysis.
(iv) Keeping observations from manufacturing. After the previous constraints, the worker panel includes 8,988,169 worker-year observations and 2,209,338 workers. We then merged the worker data with …rms operating in manufacturing and services. This yields a worker-…rm panel with information on 8,348,861 worker-year observations, 2,049,522 workers and 251,945 …rms. After further dropping the observations for which data on the independent variables were missing, and keeping data only from mainland Portugal, the …nal worker-…rm panel gathers information on 1,886,703 workers, 216,681 …rms and 198 sectorial agreements for the years 1991 to 2000, yielding a total of 7,420,900 observations. 
